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1 Introduction
Modern theories of the rm show that, in a world with incomplete contracts, the structure of
property rights over assets inuences the size of the gains from economic activity by a¤ecting
agents incentives to invest.1 From this perspective, who has control over critical resources
determines economic performance, and the allocation of control rights over essential primary
inputs acquires paramount importance for developing countries richly endowed with natural
wealth. In this paper, we investigate the e¤ects on aggregate income of di¤erent regimes of
control rights over the exploitation of oil, one of the economically most important natural re-
sources. We construct a new dataset on petroleum ownership structures for up to 68 countries
in the 1867-2008 period by collecting data from primary and secondary sources. Our analysis
has three distinctive features. First, we depart from standard observations concerning sectoral
e¢ ciency and analyze, instead, the consequences of di¤erent control regimes in the primary
sector for the aggregate domestic income of oil-rich economies. Second, we look beyond the
conventional division between private and public ownership and instead focus on domestic,
foreign, and mixed international partnershipstructures. Third, we address the role of polit-
ical contingencies in shaping the ownership-income nexus by distinguishing between di¤erent
political regimes.
In most countries, the State is the de jure owner of domestic natural resources.2 Given this
basic assignment of ownership, the salient question becomes who has control rights over the
exploitation of these resource stocks. In this respect, situations of substantial foreign control
over strategic primary resources are quite common in todays globalized world. Considering a
representative sample of sixty-four oil-producing economies in 2005, we observe that Domestic
Control over extraction is the dominant property structure in only nine countries: Foreign
Control and international Partnerships prevail in the vast majority of cases twenty-four and
thirty-one countries, respectively.3 Standard economic reasoning suggests that technological
1Property rights structures specify the separation between operative control rights (e.g., using and having
access to productive assets) and ownership, which conveys residual control rights (e.g., regaining control over
previously rented assets). In line with this notion, we use the terms property rights structures and control
regimes interchangeably.
2The United Nations General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December, 1962 (on Permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources) grants The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources, a concept that is echoed in most countriesconstitutions.
3See Section 4 below for a detailed description of sources and methods.
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gaps play a fundamental role in the rise of foreign-control regimes or international partnerships.
Countries that discover new stocks of natural resources often lack the technological know-how
necessary to exploit these endowments, and the foreign rms operating abroad in the sector of
interest are typically more e¢ cient than yet-to-be-established domestic enterprises.
In this scenario which most likely but not exclusively arises in less developed economies 
the resource-rich country may gain from assigning full or partial control rights to foreign rms:
the natural endowment is exploited with the most e¢ cient technology and generates additional
domestic income as the foreign rm pays concession fees and royalties. The ip side of these
international arrangements is that the prot shares and resource rents accruing to foreign rms
are largely repatriated and potentially re-invested abroad. A recent OECD study shows that, in
low-income countries, foreign rmsprot remittances exceeded new foreign direct investment
inows in every year between 1999-2005 a pattern which is especially strong during periods
of economic crisis, when parent companies tend to repatriate nancial resources to strengthen
their balance sheet (Mold et al., 2009). More generally, foreign-based rms have little interest
in raising domestic welfare in the host country as this is beyond the scope of their prot-
maximization obligation towards shareholders (Vrankel, 1980; Onorato, 1995).
To single out relationships between aggregate income and control rights over critical re-
sources, we adopt a conceptual framework that partially resembles the GHM model pioneered
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). In the GHM framework, the rm
is viewed as a project involving two parties that choose investment strategies and share prots
conditionally on asset ownership. In our context, the primary sector is an entreprise extracting
natural resources to produce a commodity, and the parties involved are the State, which is the
initial owner of natural resource stocks, and extracting rms that act as technology providers.
The allocation of both operative and residual control rights over the various assets used dur-
ing the production process is determined by the contract that the State o¤ers to rms. In
particular, the State may choose among Domestic control, Foreign control and international
Partnerships, where the latter regime implies that foreign rms and domestic entities jointly
own the project.
Within this scheme, we disentangle the property-income relationship as follows. First,
control regimes a¤ect sectoral protability through the impact of property rights on sectoral
investments and prot sharing. Second, prot sharing and input allocation in the primary sector
inuence aggregate income via, respectively, the direct impact of rents accruing to domestic
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residents and side-e¤ects on input availability in other sectors. Third, political contingencies
a¤ect the size and direction of the two previous mechanisms by determining the investment
environment.
The theoretical literature provides specic insights mainly on the rst mechanism: inter-
preting the project as a repeated game, partnerships may increase sectoral protability relative
to individual ownership by discouraging opportunistic investment (Halonen, 2002), by elim-
inating ine¢ cient bargaining induced by asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2008) and, more
generally, by creating reputational concerns among the parties (Bar-Isaac, 2007). Concerning
the role of political contingencies, models with insecure property rights suggest that political
regimes inuence productivity by determining the expropriation risk faced by private rms and,
more generally, the degree of enforceability of contracts in which the State is a contractor as
well as the nations coercive authority (Thomas and Worrall, 1994). There are no theories,
however, concerning the impact on aggregate domestic income of domestic/foreign control and
partnerships in strategic primary sectors. In section 3.2, we emphasize two unexplored chan-
nels represented by excessive residual rights and asymmetric benets. Besides these two
potential mechanisms, control regimes will a¤ect aggregate income via their impact on the level
of rents accruing to domestic residents.
In our empirical analysis, we focus on the petroleum sector because oil is an essential input
and is found in a large number of countries in di¤erent regions and at di¤erent stages of economic
development, making a comparison particularly relevant. Collecting data from a variety of
primary and secondary sources, we construct a large new dataset on control rights regimes and
national incomes for up to 68 oil-producing countries, starting as early as 1867 and extending
to 2008 in up to 28 ve-year periods. We explore the empirical relationship between control
regimes and domestic income levels using xed-e¤ects panel data estimations. Our results show
that both Partnership and Foreign Control have led to higher domestic income than Domestic
Control. We take into account the technology level, following the reasoning mentioned above
that newly-discovered oil deposits in previously oil-poor countries are most likely to require
foreign technology for exploitation. We also give particular attention to political contingency,
not only as it a¤ects the economic outcome, but also because it may shape the choice of control
rights regime. Separating our sample into democracies, autocracies, and anocracies, we nd
that Partnership-style control regimes are still linked to the highest income levels, regardless
of political regime type. Our results are highly signicant and robust to controlling for factors
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such as schooling, investment, openness, OPEC membership and time e¤ects.
Our empirical results complement the empirical literature on ownership structures analyzing
the consequences of private versus public ownership for the productive e¢ ciency of primary
sectors (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1992; Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009). In several related studies
from the political science eld, Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) have long held that
ownership structures are important when looking at the socio-economic impacts of resource
abundance, particularly petroleum and natural gas. We draw inspiration from their work but
depart from their focus on public versus private ownership and scal policy outcomes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual framework guiding
our analysis; Section 3 places our work in the context of the theoretical literature on property
rights and draws some relevant conclusions; Section 4 describes our new dataset and presents
our empirical methodology and the results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
Property rights structures dene a basic separation between operative control rights (e.g., having
access to capital, using the asset for productive purposes, improving the asset by investing in
innovations) and ownership, which conveys residual control rights (e.g., regaining control over
rented capital and excluding the tenant from further use when the agreement expires or breaks
down). This distinction immediately suggests that property rights structures inuence economic
performance by shaping individual investment incentives, although modern economic theories
began to address this point only recently (see Besley and Ghatak, 2010). In particular, the
property-rights theory of the rm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) emphasizes
the role of incomplete contracts in determining a relationship between control regimes and
productivity outcomes. In the GHM framework, the rm is a project involving two parties
endowed with di¤erent control rights over the rms assets. The parties rst choose levels of
project-specic investments and then bargain about how to share the resulting prots. With
incomplete contracts, investment choices (and, hence, a rms total prots) will depend on the
structure of property rights.
Applying this general setup to our context, the project consists of exploiting a natural
resource stock to produce a commodity, and the parties involved are the State, which is the de
jure owner of the resource stock, and rms that act as technology providers. While the State
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retains ownership rights over the resource stock, the allocation of both operative and residual
control rights over the assets used within the project e.g., assets used in resource extraction,
processing, commodity transport and sale  is determined by the type of contract the State
grants to extracting rms. Our focus is on the consequences of granting contracts to domestic
versus foreign technology providers. In this respect, the State may choose among three regimes:
Domestic Control, which assigns all control rights to domestic enterprises (which may be public
or private); Foreign Control, which assigns all control rights to foreign rms (which may have
the better technology); or creating an international Partnership in which foreign rms and
domestic (public or private) entities jointly own the project.
Two distinctive features of the problem we address concern the asymmetric objectives of
the parties involved, and the transmission mechanisms between sectoral control regimes and
aggregate income. In the rst respect, evidence suggests that foreign rms repatriate their
share of prots to their country of origin whereas governments supposedly aim at maximizing
domestic income. In the second respect, we disentangle the income-ownership relationship into
three sub-mechanisms: (i) the impact of control regimes on the primary sectors protability,
(ii) the impact of the primary sector on aggegrate income, and (iii) the impact of political
contingencies on the size and direction of the two previous e¤ects. The existing theories do not
capture all these aspects into a unied model. We can nonetheless draw relevant insights from
di¤erent strands of literature, which we summarize below.
3 Theoretical Results
This section discusses the results and potential insights of property-rights theories with respect
to the ownership-prot nexus at the sectoral level (sect. 3.1), the ownership-income relationship
at the aggregate level (sect. 3.2), and the impact of political contingencies (sect. 3.3).
3.1 Property Rights and Sectoral Protability
The Benchmark GHM Model. The property-rights theory of the rm builds on the idea that
residual control rights over assets are a source of power within the rm. In the benchmark
GHM model (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), investments are not con-
tractible at the rst stage and a¤ect the partiesrelative bargaining power at the prot-sharing
stage. Therefore, the party in charge of investments has an incentive to pursue opportunistic
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investment strategies that raise its own prot share while undermining e¢ ciency at the rm
level. In particular, the benchmark model predicts that4
Result 1 (Benchmark GHM Model) Residual control rights raise the incentive to invest above
the e¢ cient level. The owner should be the party able to obtain the highest marginal return
from own investment.
Result 1 hinges on two hypotheses. First, residual rights allow the owner to obtain, in the
event of bargaining breakdown, some positive prot without the other partys collaboration and
this default payo¤ increases with the level of investment chosen at the rst stage. Second, the
owners default payo¤ acts as a threatto the other agent because Nash bargaining determines
a prot-sharing rule whereby the owners share increases with the owners default payo¤. In
general, a party that correctly anticipates the impact of investments on default payo¤s will
calibrate investments so as to increase its relative bargaining power. More specically, the owner
tends to over-invest because a higher default payo¤ increases the threat to the other agent and
thereby the owners prot share. Since selsh investment strategies generate ine¢ ciently low
prots at the rm level, the (ex-post) optimal control regime is to allocate ownership to the
party with the highest marginal return.
Modied GHM Models. In the Benchmark GHM model, partnerships are not optimal be-
cause joint residual rights act like reciprocal veto powers leading to more ine¢ cient investments.
However, the prediction that partnerships cannot be optimal is counterfactual (Holmström,
1999) and the recent literature has identied a number of circumstances under which joint
ownership may yield the highest surplus. The main arguments are listed below.
Result 2 (Modied GHM Models) Joint ownership is potentially optimal when:
(a) the parties engage in repeated relationships (Halonen, 2002; Bar-Isaac, 2007)
(b) the parties have asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2008)
(c) the project output involves public goods or externalities (Besley and Ghatak, 2001)
(d) default payo¤s represent outside options (Chiu, 1998)
4Concise formal proofs of Result 1 are Proposition 2 in Schmitz (2008) and Result 6 in Besley and Gathak
(2010).
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Result 2(a) hinges on signalling and reputational concerns. With respect to the one-shot
game of the benchmark GHM model, the owners ability to re the collaborator is a much
less binding threat in repeated games because it exposes the rm to a reputation loss that
will a¤ect future relationships and thereby the rms future protability. Joint ownership may
thus yield the highest social surplus by being the structure that provides the strongest punish-
ment if one party deviates (Halonen, 2002) or, more generally, the most credible commitment
device (Bar-Isaac, 2007). The general message is that the gains induced by joint ownerships
through loyaltyoutweigh the gains induced by individual ownerships through opportunism.
This conclusion is of direct interest to our analysis since allocations of control rights over oil
exploitation typically involve long-lasting economic relationships.
Result 2(b) follows from relaxing a relevant hypothesis in the GHM scheme, namely that
parties have symmetric information. Schmitz (2008) shows that joint ownership may be optimal
when a party is able to acquire private information about its own default payo¤ between the
investment stage and the bargaining stage. The reason is that, under asymmetric information,
individual ownership makes the bargaining outcomes ex-post ine¢ cient whereas joint owner-
ship ensures e¢ cient prot sharing: the partys anticipation of ex-post e¢ ciency under joint
ownership a¤ects investment incentives yielding positive e¤ects on total prots.5
Result 2(c) establishes that when the parties enjoy external benets from the project in
addition to the returns to own investments, partnerships become potentially optimal as they
minimize free-riding: joint ownership is more likely to dominate individual ownership the greater
is the public good component in production (Besley and Ghatak, 2001).
Result 2(d) was rst conjectured by Chiu (1998). In the GHM model, residual control rights
induce over-investment because default payo¤s act as a threatin view of the assumption that
parties split the total surplus according to Nash bargaining. However, if parties share prots
according to the alternative method known as deal-me-out division, default payo¤s represent
an outside option that may induce the party without residual rights to invest more due to
the fear of losing prots in the event of bargaining breakdown. This result suggests that joint
ownership may dominate individual ownership because dual veto power can be more e¢ cient
than sole ownership by either player (Chiu, 1998: p.891).
5 In the GHM framework, investments are ine¢ cient but bargaining is e¢ cient ex-post. In Schmitz (2008),
instead, bargaining is ine¢ cient ex-post under individual ownership because the friction induced by asymmetric
information hits the sequence of events after investments have been made.
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Endogenous Selection of Contractors. In the GHM model, the existence and characteristics
of the parties are exogenous and the rm is mainly viewed as a collection of assets. From a
di¤erent perspective, rms arise and develop starting from an initial state, in which the original
owner controls the assets and seeks possibilities to enhance productivity through collaboration,
considering di¤erent degrees of involvement of new parties ranging from simple hiring to part-
nerships entailing the sharing of the rms prots. This view underlies the analyses of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Levin and Tadelis (2005), and is relevant to our analysis since, in most
countries, the granting of concessions over oil exploitation includes a selection process super-
vised by the government. Rajan and Zingales (1998), in particular, show that allocating access
rights to critical resources may be a superior mechanism than allocating ownership because the
power agents get from access is more contingent on their making the right investment, whereas
ownership has adverse e¤ects on the incentive to specialize. This result suggests that a spe-
cic notion of partnership namely, an organization of production in which the State allows
rms to extract and rene oil without transferring full control over the management of the oil
deposit to them may optimize the rmsincentive to enhance productivity via more e¢ cient
investments. Whether and to what extent this conclusion is applicable to primary sectors in
resource-rich countries is an open question that deserves future research.6
3.2 Property Rights and Total Domestic Income
Our analysis focuses on how total domestic income is a¤ected by the international allocation
of control rights over strategic primary sectors. Tackling this problem requires identifying
transmission channels between sectoral protability and aggregate income, as well as considering
asymmetries in the objectives of the two parties. Both these issues are unexplored at the
theoretical level7 but nonetheless suggest two potential transmission channels which we label
6Levin and Tadelis (2005) depart more fundamentally from the GHM framework and consider hiring policies
when product quality is not observable ex-ante by clients. In this setting, partnerships that maximize prots
per partner induce more selection than corporations and this translates into a higher quality product. While
Levin and Tadelis (2005) aim at explaining partnerships in service sectors, their theory seems more general. If
we reinterpret the assumption of non-observable product quality as asymmetric information between the initial
owner and a pool of technology providers competing for access, partnerships may optimize the selection of
technology providers and yield productivity gains ex-post (possibly connected with Result 2(b) above).
7The contributions reviewed in section 3.1 study the impact of property rights structures on economic perfor-
mance, identifying the latter with sectoral protability. The parallel literature studying control rightsallocation
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as excessive residual rightsand asymmetric benets.
Excessive residual rights. In the benchmark GHM model, the conclusion that residual con-
trol rights induce over-investment unveils a potential source of Resource-Curse phenomena 
i.e., a reduction in aggregate productivity induced by excessive input absorption by primary
sectors. If the State grants some critical residual rights to foreign rms involved in the exploita-
tion of domestic resources, private over-investment in the resource sector may crowd-out the use
of productive assets in other sectors of the economy and lead to ine¢ ciently low productivity at
the aggregate level. From this perspective, assigning Foreign Control over domestic resources
may induce lower domestic income relative to International Partnerships via excessive residual
rights, which would be a novel explanation for Resource-Curse phenomena.8
Asymmetric benets. Empirical evidence suggests that foreign rms aim at maximizing own
prots whereas national authorities i.e., the State supposedly aim at maximizing domestic
incomes. These asymmetric objectives imply a re-denition of the concept of joint surplus with
respect to theories of the rm. In particular, if the State objective takes into account the side-
e¤ects of the primary sectors investments on other sectors of the economy, a partnership regime
in which the State retains some control rights over domestically mobile assets or regulates the
primary sectors use of public infrastructures may be more suitable to attain high domestic total
income. This argument is linked to Besley and Ghataks (2001) result: when the parties value
the project di¤erently, ownership should lie with the party with highest valuation regardless of
who is the key investor. Several case studies indeed stress the maximization of national income
and the pursuit of national interest as a major reason behind state involvement in strategic
sectors (Kobrin, 1984; Randall, 1987).9
between public authorities and private agents (e.g. Besley and Gathak, 2001) typically denies international is-
sues. The international dimension of control-rights allocation is considered in open-economy extensions of the
GHM model see Antràs (2014) that, however, address di¤erent issues such as outsourcing strategies and the
rise of multinational rms.
8The theoretical explanations for the rise of Resource-Curse phenomena are diverse: see Melhum et al. (2006)
and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) are the only authors to our
knowledge who stress the role of oil ownership structures in the context of the resource curse; however, they
focus on scal outcomes (see the empirical section below for more details). The resource curse literature has so
far neglected the possibility that the crowding-out mechanism stems from incomplete contracts and the granting
of excessive residual rights to foreign rms.
9Kobrin (1984) traces the evolution of petroleum sector control rights from mostly foreign control to increasing
participation (right up to nationalization) by host-country governments as "the perception that foreign investors
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Besides the mechanisms of excessive residual rights and asymmetric benets, control
regimes in primary sectors obviously a¤ect aggregate income via their impact on the level of
rents accruing to domestic residents. Still, a proper account of the ownership-income nexus at
the aggregate level would require explicit consideration of specialization e¤ects that are seldom
studied at the theoretical level.10
3.3 Property Rights and Political Contingency
A dening characteristic of the State is its coercive authority, which converys inter alia the
power to enforce property rights or, in a negative sense, the power to expropriate. This aspect is
relevant since the perception of higher expropriation risk reduces private incentives to invest and
therefore the protability of projects based on agreements between State and rms.11 Theory
suggests that these ine¢ ciencies can be minimized if the States ability to expropriate is limited
by means of commitment devices or by self-enforcing contracts. Considering international
partnerships in oil extraction, external commitment devices are hardly e¤ective,12 but self-
enforcing agreements may be feasible. Thomas and Worrall (1994) study a model of FDI
agreements and show that contracts limiting expropriation risk are self-enforcing when there
are dynamic gains from cooperation: the host country trades o¤ its short-term incentive to
could not be trusted to develop resources in the national interest became widespread" (ibid., p. 146). In her
case study, Randall (1987) describes how the "remarkably high rate of repatriation of prots [by foreign oil rms]
from Venezuela" (ibid., .21) led to a decades-long series of negotiations over rent distribution that culminated in
the 1976 nationalization of the petroleum industry.
10Specialization e¤ects are seldom studied also at the empirical level. An exception is the analysis of Lederman
and Maloney (2007), which links aggregate economic performance to resource abundance after controlling for
specialization e¤ects: their results suggest that resource abundance increases the potential for productivity
growth whereas high sectoral concentration of export revenues hampers productivity.
11Bohn and Deacon (2000) provide empirical evidence supporting the investment-reducing e¤ect in oil-related
industries. Expropriation risk also underlies the cross-country evidence provided by Melhum et al. (2006) on the
institutional resource curse, i.e., the fact that resource-rich countries display low (high) income and slow (fast)
growth when institutions are grabber-friendly (producer-friendly).
12Modern petroleum contracts include explicit provisions for arbitration in case of disputes (Taverne, 1994;
Onorato, 1995) but these clauses are di¢ cult to enforce since the host countrys government is often a contractor.
A case in point is the recent dispute between Spanish oil company Repsol and the Argentinian government, which
led to a lenghty dispute, delays in energy-related investments in Argentina as well as to tensions between the
national governments before a compensation deal was nally reached (Reuters, "Spains Repsol has initial deal
with Argentina on YPF", Nov 25 2013).
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expropriate with the long-term incentive to foster good relations with potential investors that
will provide further benets in the future. Whether these grounds for establishing partnerships
are solid is an open question. Guriev et al. (2011) show, both theoretically and empirically,
that increases in the oil price make nationalizations more likely to happen because the incentive
to expropriate suddenly becomes dominant due to external factors (i.e., the increase in market
value of the oil deposit). Nonetheless, if we focus on the relationship between control regimes
and productivity, the results of Thomas and Worrall (1994) are in line with those of Halonen
(2002) and Bar-Isaac (2007) showing that joint ownership is potentially superior in repeated
games (cf. Result 2(a) above). This issue has historically been relevant for oil industries since
conscation characterized several processes of nationalization (Guriev et al. 2011), but the
opposite case of State repurchase, including forms of compensation such as preferential access
for the formally expropriated rms, is not a rare event either (Philip, 1994).
3.4 From Theory to Empirics
The theoretical literature discussed above suggests three main remarks. First, control regimes
and access rights inuence sectoral productivity by shaping investment incentives and inter-
national Partnerships may boost the primary sectors protability when agreements involve
long-lasting relationships. Second, input reallocation and specialization e¤ects spreading from
the primary to other sectors induce asymmetric objectives between foreign rms and the State,
possibly providing further rationale for joint control over resource exploitation. Third, political
contingencies enhance (depress) productivity by determining a lower (higher) expected risk of
expropriation.
However, the existing theories do not yield specic predictions on the impact of resources
control rights on aggregate income, adding relevance to an empirical analysis of this relationship.
Tackling this issue empirically is furthermore interesting in view of two facts. First, the existing
empirical literature on ownership and resource extraction (e.g., Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009)
concentrates on the protability, or e¢ ciency, of the primary sectors without assessing the
impact on aggregate income. Second, the property-productivity nexus is likely to depend on
several economic and political factors, including the technology level in the domestic (oil-rich)
country if it is very high, there may be little benet in granting control rights to foreign rms
and political contingency  in particular, the State reliability as an enforcer. In the latter
respect, we stress that low (high) expropriation risk is not necessarily associated to high (low)
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levels of democracy because the stability of political regimes can be more important than their
level of democratization. This is indeed one of the conclusions of our empirical analysis in the
next section.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis revolves around the fundamental question: what type of control regime
leads to highest aggregate income in oil-producing countries? We address this issue empirically
by constructing a new dataset on petroleum ownership structures for up to 68 countries between
1867-2008. In the estimations, we control for the e¤ects of technology levels and political
contingencies, as well as a range of others factors, on the relationship between control regimes
in oil extaction and aggregate domestic income. Below, we rst describe the dataset on oil
control rights and the empirical methodology, and then discuss the estimation results.
4.1 Oil Control Rights Dataset
Our dataset includes information on 68 oil-producing countries from all regions of the world
(see the Appendix for a detailed list). The main criteria for inclusion in the dataset were that
the country had a minimum of 0.2 billion barrels in (proved) oil reserves between 1980-2008,
and that it produced an average of at least 20000 barrels of crude oil per day during at least
one year over the same period.13 The principal source for this information was the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA). We cross-checked the entries from the EIA with the BP
Statistical Review of World Energy (2010), which covers fewer countries in detail, but over a
longer time period. Our sample includes 96.6 percent of known worldwide proved crude oil
reserves in 1980, while in 2008 the share goes up to 99.9 percent.
The main variable of interest is the control rights structure of the petroleum industry. We
distinguish between Domestic, Foreign, and mixed domestic-foreign (i.e., Partnership) control
rights regimes.14 Note that our classication methodology is inspired by the one developed by
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010), but di¤ers from it in that we distinguish between
Domestic, Foreign, and mixed Domestic-Foreign control of the petroleum sector. Jones Luong
13These inclusion criteria are similar to the ones implemented by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010).
14We focus on oil exploration and extraction/ production. The oil renery and petroleum-derived products
industries are not considered, as these do not presume the presence of an actual oil production sector in a country
and are therefore more similar to other manufacturing sectors.
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and Weinthal draw up four categories of resource ownership with a focus on private versus
public ownership and control: state ownership with control, state ownership without control,
private domestic ownership, and private foreign ownership. Moreover, our sample includes a
wider range of countries from both the developed and the developing world and we are interested
in overall income e¤ects, while they concentrate mainly on transition economies and consider
only scal policy outcomes.
We code each country according to the following criteria:
Domestic Control : The state or private domestic rm(s) holds the rights to develop the major-
ity of petroleum deposits and owns the majority of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector. The
managerial power lies mainly in domestic hands, with foreign involvement being limited
to roles with little or no operational and managerial control (e.g., service contracts).
Partnership: The rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and the majority
of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector lie in domestic hands, but there is substantial
involvement by foreign rms. Both domestic and foreign oil rms (private or public) have
operational and managerial competencies, e.g., through Production Sharing Agreements
(PSAs).
Foreign Control : Foreign (private or state-owned) rms hold the rights to develop the majority
of petroleum deposits and own the majority of shares (over 50%) in the domestic oil sector.
The managerial power lies mainly in foreign hands, e.g., via concessions.
As these criteria imply, control right structures are seldom absolute in the sense that either
domestic or foreign rms hold the exclusive rights to all exploration and extraction of petro-
leum. For practical purposes, the essential point is who holds the majority rights to exploit
petroleum deposits according to domestic legislation. For the coding, we rely on the countries
constitutions, o¢ cial laws and regulations governing the petroleum sector, sample petroleum
contracts (where available), and secondary sources. The initial (post-independence) year of
inclusion of each country is based on the date of the rst national law, rule or regulation per-
taining explicitly to the petroleum sector.15 This method allowed us to gather information on
15The only exception is Canada, where petroleum-specic legislation is passed by the provincial governments,
while the national government sets out the laws for the mining sector in general. The rst mining sector law
was passed in 1867, the year of Canadas independence from Great Britain. Given that oil rening (for kerosene
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control regimes for 68 countries starting as early as 1867 up until 2008, with the average time
period of a countrys inclusion being around 53 years (see the Appendix for a detailed data
description).
We condense the dataset into ve-year periods to avoid capturing short-term uctuations,
starting with the period 1870-1874, 1875-1879, ..., until 2005-2008, for a total of potentially 28
periods and 761 observations. Since not all countries enter the dataset at the same time, we
have an unbalanced panel. 209 country-periods had Domestic control; 306 had Foreign control;
and 246 had Partnership. 36 countries from all parts of the world changed their regimes at
least once during the period of observation, for a total of nearly 60 switches. Many changed
regimes twice or even more, with Bolivia showing a record ve changes since 1920. Several of
these regime changes, especially in the pre-1970 period, came in the wake of general national
upheavals such as revolutions or other profound changes in the political regime. In more recent
times, changes have usually come about more smoothly during the course of adapting the
control regimes to new developments and learning processes. The inuence of politics on both
control regime choice and income levels is a potential source of bias that we will seek to address
in the empirical analysis.
4.2 Methodology
We would like to investigate whether di¤erent oil control regimes have led to di¤erent develop-
ment outcomes in terms of income per capita in oil-producing countries. Our empirical strategy
is to control for country-specic xed e¤ects that could be a¤ecting both factors, i.e., we use
a panel xed-e¤ects estimation approach (note that the Hausman test rejects random-e¤ects
estimation in favor of xed e¤ects). We do not argue that our ndings will establish a causal
relationship beyond any shadow of a doubt;16 but we do believe that the major source of omit-
ted variable bias is likely to stem from (historical) characteristics of a country, which can be
captured by xed e¤ects. To minimize other potential sources of omitted variable bias, we
control for other time-varying factors in our sensitivity analysis, and in a second step (see 4.4)
production) was originally invented in Canada in the 1840s, and that the Canadian petroleum industry developed
in parallel with that of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, we argue that the 1867
law fully applies to the petroleum sector. Canada therefore enters our dataset in 1867.
16The ideal strategy for demonstrating causality would be using an instrumental variables approach with strong
exogenous instruments.
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also explore in more detail the e¤ects of political contingency.
Our basic estimation model is as follows:
Yit = 1 + 2regimedummyit + 3Xit + !it; (1)
where i is the country and t the period index. The dependent variable Yit is (the natural
logarithm of) real income per capita at the start of period t, taken from the historical dataset
of Maddison (2006) and measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP-adjusted USD. Xit is a vector of
control variables, and !it is the composite error term (see below). Our main variable of interest
is regimedummyit and its coe¢ cient 2.
We have three 0-1 regime dummies for Domestic Control, Foreign Control and Partnership,
constructed according to the classication described above. A dummy takes on value one if a
country had the respective control regime for at least three of the ve years in a given period.
We choose Domestic Control as our base outcome and test whether Partnership and Foreign
Control led to higher incomes than Domestic Control at a given technology level. The latter
point is important as we argue that the choice of control regime is greatly inuenced by the level
of technology in a country at the time oil exploitation is decided upon. The challenge lies in
nding a good proxy for technology level: we choose average labor productivity per worker in a
period, measured in thousands of 1990 USD (The Conference Board Total Economy Database,
2011). This is a commonly used measure for technology in applied work, and it o¤ers the
additional benet of having a wide data coverage starting in 1950.17 In addition to the measure
of labor productivity, our baseline estimation also includes time period dummies.
In further estimations, we include the following control variables. First, a dummy variable
for membership in the Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC), to take into
consideration the possible e¤ects of the wave of nationalizations that swept through the major
oil producers in the late 1950s and 1960s and led to the Organizations creation. This provides
a historical reason for the adoption of a particular control rights structure not considered by
conventional theory. Another potentially relevant factor that could a¤ect both the choice of
control regime and income is "oil geography", or where the oil is located  either onshore
or o¤shore. O¤shore oil requires more sophisticated technology and is more likely to involve
17Unfortunately, this still doesnt take full advantage of our data on control structures, but we are not aware
of a proxy for technology reaching even further back in time for a large set of countries. For comparison, we also
provide estimation results without labor productivity that use all observations in our dataset.
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foreign rms. Lujala et al. (2007) also nd that o¤shore oil is less probable to lead to violent
conict, and conict depresses income levels. We construct an o¤shore oil dummy based on the
information compiled by Lujala et al. (2007).18
We also include two political variables taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al.,
2010) as a rst stab at controlling for the e¤ects of political stability and institutional quality
(i.e., the investment environment) on the type of petroleum sector contracts that a country
o¤ers. Foreign or Partnership regimes would be less likely in countries with poor institutional
quality and unstable or unpredictable political systems, as this increases the uncertainty for
foreign rms evaluating an investment in the oil sector. The rst political measure is the
composite variable polity (i.e., the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset), which assigns
values between -10 (strong autocracy) and 10 (strong democracy) to all political systems. The
second political measure is one of the component variables of the total polity score, namely
executive constraints. This arguably also proxies for the strength of the legal system and
particularly property rights (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).19 We expect both political
measures to enter with a positive sign. For now, we focus on this general specication of
political contingency. In section 4.4, we will unravel the inuence of political factors in more
detail by distinguishing between regime types (i.e., democracies, autocracies, and anocracies).
We further include typical covariates from the income and growth literature: investment
ratios as a percentage of GDP and openness measured as the GDP share of the sum of exports
and imports (both from PWT 7.1, Heston et al. 2012), and years of schooling (Barro and
Lee, 2010). All three variables are averaged over each period and are expected to enter with a
positive sign. Details for all variables are provided in the Appendix.
All independent variables except for the OPEC and period dummies are lagged by one period
to address another potential source of endogeneity, namely reverse causality: the development
level (i.e., the income) of a country may inuence its choice of control regime. Similar results
were obtained for up to six lags (i.e., 30 years); beyond this the sample size starts to become
too small for meaningful inference. Income levels are surely less persistent than the 30-year
period for which our results hold, making the hypothesized direction of inuence from control
regime towards income instead of vice versa more probable. Moreover, we explicitly control
18We do not include a dummy for onshore oil as nearly every oil-producing country has this type of oil.
19The variable executive constraints was purged of all cases of political transition or interrruption (coded as
-88, -77, or -66 in the Polity IV dataset), adding 31 missing observations to our dataset.
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for the level of technology a crucial development characteristic in our context by including
labor productivity (described above).20
The composite error term consists of the country-specic error component i and the com-
bined cross-section and time series error component uit, according to !it = i + uit. We tackle
the issue of serial correlation by reporting two di¤erent estimates of the standard errors.21
The rst uses robust clustered errors at the panel (i.e., country) level. This approach of one-
level-up clustering - in this case, at the country instead of the country-period level - allows
for unrestricted correlation of the residuals within clusters (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, ch. 8).
The second approach uses adjusted standard errors according to the nonparametric covariance
matrix estimator introduced by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and adapted by Hoechle (2007) to
unbalanced panels. This approach has the added advantage of producing heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors that are robust to very general types of both temporal and spatial
dependence. The latter point may be important when we consider the possible di¤usion and
contagion e¤ects of events across oil producers, for example the signalling e¤ect of the unsuc-
cessful nationalization of the petroleum sector in Iran in 1951 or the formation of OPEC in
1960.22
4.3 Main results
Table 1 shows the main estimation results. The rst two columns show parsimonious speci-
cations for comparison: column (1) includes only the control regime dummies, using the full
sample of 63 countries for which we have income data available. Partnership has an econom-
ically large but statistically insignicant e¤ect, although the positive sign seems reliable (the
20We are not interested in dynamic e¤ects and the partial adjustment of income to ownership structures over
time, so we do not add a lagged dependent variable.
21The assumption of the classical error component model is that any temporal persistence is due to the presence
of the same country i across the panel, and that this e¤ect can be captured by the xed country term i. However,
this is likely to be too restrictive here, where a shock - e.g., a control regime change - in one period could a¤ect
the behavioral relationship for several periods (see e.g., Baltagi, 2008, ch. 5.2). The error component uit would
then be serially correlated across periods: tests following Wooldridge (2002) conrm this suspicion. Failing to
correct standard errors for serial correlation leads to biased statistical inference and less e¢ cient estimates.
22For example, Myers Ja¤e (2007) argues that the events in Iran between 1951-54  the failed oil sector
nationalization a¤ected policy in Iraq, since the Iraqi government was considering similar measures to increase
its share in foreign companiesoil prots, but then opted for a less aggressive ownership strategy. On di¤usion
as a possible exogenous explanation for nationalization (or lack thereof), see also Kobrin (1985).
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p-values using clustered and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are, respectively, 0.218 and 0.102).
Foreign Control has a large negative and signicant impact on income, suggesting that it has
led to lower income levels than Domestic Control, without considering any other factors. Col-
umn (2) adds our proxy for the technology level (i.e., labor productivity), making the sample
size shrink by nearly 200 observations and six countries. We see that now, ceteris paribus,
both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to signicantly higher per-capita income levels than
Domestic Control. The average income e¤ect of Partnership is nearly twice as high as that of
Foreign Control: choosing Partnership appears to have led to income per capita around 26 per-
cent (or, more precisely, 100  (exp0:23 1) = 30:1 percent) higher than Domestic Control, while
choosing Foreign Control led to 11.6 percent (12.3 percent) higher income. Labor productivity
is positive, highly signicant, and has great explanatory power (judging by the R-squareds),
which was to be expected.
Our baseline estimation with period dummies is given in column (3). The coe¢ cients on the
control regime dummies show that both Partnership and Foreign Control led to signicantly
higher income levels than Domestic Control, holding all else equal, although the magnitude of
the coe¢ cient on Partnership shrinks after the introduction of the period xed e¤ects. The
ranking of control regimes still suggests that Partnership has the highest positive impact on
income levels (around 15 percent or 16.3 percent to be exact higher than Domestic Control),
followed by Foreign Control (10.4 or 11 percent higher than Domestic Control).
The remaining columns successively add the control variables described in 4.2. We see that
joining OPEC has had no discernible e¤ect on income levels, not has the level of schooling.
Discovering o¤shore oil seems to have had a small positive income e¤ect, though it is not
entirely robust. Higher investment shares and greater openness to trade have also had positive
e¤ects on income. The inclusion of investment also reduces the magnitude of the control
regime coe¢ cients, and although Partnership remains highly signicant, Foreign Control loses
signicance.
Interestingly, the polity indicator is consistently negatively related to income, suggesting
that democracies have seen lower income levels than autocracies. This seems puzzling, though
the relationship between income and democracy is subject to debate (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al.
2008). As a rst sensitivity test, we substitute executive constraints a proxy of property rights
security for polity. The results are shown in Table 2, with specications otherwise analogous to
those of columns (6)-(9) of Table 1. The substitution makes no qualitative di¤erence to the main
19
variables of interest, the dummies for Partnership and Foreign control: these remain positive
and (for the case of Partnership) highly signicant, and their magnitudes are substantially
unaltered. And again, the institutional measure is consistenly negative, though not always
signicant. The e¤ect of the institutional measures may be driven by the inuence of so-called
"anocracies": political regimes that are neither strong democracies nor strong autocracies, but
instead lie in the middle range on the polity and executive constraints scales. Both strong
democracies and strong autocracies o¤er more stable investment environments than anocracies,
which may be biasing the e¤ect of the more general political variables. Since we are particularly
interested in the potential interaction e¤ects between various political regimes and the choice
of oil control regime, we will explore this point further in Section 4.4 below.
The results so far suggest that some degree of foreign involvement is better than "going it
alone": both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher income than Domestic Control.
However, the di¤erences between the main coe¢ cients may not be as systematic as the ndings
above suggest; Partnership may actually not be strictly preferable to Foreign Control in terms
of its income e¤ects. From the States point of view, the choice of degree of foreign involvement
is often politically sensitive, so we will explore the exact ranking a little bit further. Wald tests
reject equality of the coe¢ cients for Partnership and Foreign Control in ve out of the nine
specications shown in Table 1 (we cannot reject equality at conventional levels in specications
(3)-(6)). In additional sensitivity analyses (see Table 6 in the Appendix), we set Foreign Control
as the base outcome to directly test whether Partnership indeed has higher positive income
e¤ects than Foreign Control. The results support the conclusions from the simple Wald tests on
the ndings from Table 1. In specications corresponding to those shown in Table 1, Partnership
enters with a positive and signicant sign in six out of nine cases. In the remaining three cases,
signicance lies between 16 and 13 percent, which still allows us to at least put a positive sign
on the coe¢ cient.
To sum up, the evidence so far speaks in favor of the following ranking of control rights
regimes in terms of their e¤ects on income: Partnership leads to the highest income levels,
followed by Foreign control and nally Domestic control. We will now take a closer look at the
issue of political contingency.
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4.4 Political contingency
Choosing a control regime over oil resources is not only an economic and legal issue, but also
a highly political decision, especially when the natural resource sector is or will be a main
contributor to the national economy. One could argue for example that autocratic leaders
are more likely to give precedence to domestic rms and restrict access of foreign companies
for reasons of "national security" or "national interest". There are many examples of this
throughout the history of oil exploitation. Recent episodes include the (re-) nationalization of
the oil sector in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez in 2007, which undid the opening-up towards
foreign activity of the 1990s; or the stepwise moves towards sectoral domination by (public and
private) domestic oil rms in Russia under Vladimir Putin. The political environment may not
be fully captured by the combination of country and period xed e¤ects and institutional control
variables introduced so far: we may still be missing a part of the story. For example, there could
be a bias in favor of Partnership if Partnership were particularly encouraging for development
in strong autocracies, and strong autocracies were dominating our sample for several periods.
This could then lead us to erroneously conclude that Partnership has the strongest positive
income e¤ects of all control regimes.
To gain an overview, in Table 3 we rst list our three oil control regimes by political
regime autocracy, anocracy or democracy (see below for more details). The data show that
autocracies had the most ve-year-periods with Domestic Control in the sample (119 out of
288 periods with autocracy), while democracies had the fewest (38 out of 264), conrming our
conjectured autocratic bias towards Domestic Control. The table also shows that Partnership-
type control regimes are most frequent in democracies (101 out of 246 periods with Partnership),
closely followed by autocracies (96 out of 246), while they are least frequent in anocracies the
politically most unstable countries (49 out of 246). Finally, Foreign Control regimes are not
only the most frequent in absolute terms (306 out of 761 periods), but are also most often found
in democracies (125 out of 306). These summary statistics suggest that oil control regimes are
not evenly distributed across political regimes, and it is therefore worth exploring whether this
uneven distribution is driving the e¤ect of control regimes on income.
In order to investigate whether political contingency has been inuencing our results so
far, we rst interact our oil regime control variables with the polity variable. Results are
shown in column (1) of Table 4. The coe¢ cient for Partnership now gives us the impact on
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income when polity is equal to zero the "perfect" anocracy: we see that Partnership leads
to around 11 percent higher income than when there is Domestic Control. The negative signs
on the interaction terms indicate that as polity scores increase, the positive impacts of both
Foreign Control and Partnership start to diminish. At some point, the e¤ect can even become
negative: the turning points for Partnership and Foreign Control are at polity scores of 10
and 6, respectively. In a "perfect" democracy (polity=10), the impact of Partnership would be
[0:107 (0:011810) =  0:011], leading to around around 1 percent lower income than Domestic
Control, all other things equal. On the other hand, for lower polity scores, Partnership and
Foreign Control are linked to higher income levels than Domestic Control.
These initial results point towards di¤erent income e¤ects in di¤erent political regimes. In
order to gain more insight into these di¤erences in our sample of oil-producing countries, we
construct three political regime dummies for autocracy, democracy, and anocracy, based on the
original polity scores from the Polity IV dataset.23 In column (2) of Table 4, we add these
new dummy variables separately, taking anocracy as our base variable. The coe¢ cients for
Partnership and Foreign Control are similar to the ones found when using the composite polity
variable as a control (Tables 1-2). Both democracies and autocracies in our sample appear to
have had lower income levels on average than anocracies.
Wed like to know what the income e¤ects of the di¤erent oil control regimes are in each
type of political regime. In addition, we would like to compare these e¤ects to the results found
in our basic estimations in Tables 1-2 and see whether Partnership and Foreign Control still
lead to the highest income levels, regardless of the political regime of the country, and what
the exact ranking is. In order to do this, in columns (3)-(5) we interact each political regime
dummy with our oil control regime variables according to the following model:
Y = 1 + 2partnership+ 3foreign+ 4polregime+
5polregime  partnership+ 6polregime  foreign+ other factors+ ; (2)
where  is the composite error term and other factors include labor productivity and period
dummies. We omit the period and panel subscripts for simplicity.
23Following Marshall and Cope (2011), we dene autocracies as having a polity score of -6 or less; democracies
of 6 or more; and anocracies as having intermediate scores or as experiencing episodes of regimes transition or
interruption. Detailed descriptions are in the Appendix.
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Interpreting these results takes a bit of care. First, we note that the interaction e¤ects
are signicant, and that Partnership and Foreign Control both enter with positive (though not
always signicant) signs on their own. For the net e¤ect of each political regime, we need to add
up the various coe¢ cients. In column (3), for example, we test the e¤ects of having an autocratic
regime combined with our di¤erent oil control regimes. The base outcome is Domestic Control
in a democracy or anocracy (i.e., autocracy=0). The net e¤ect of Partnership in an autocracy
is (2+ 4+ 5 = 0:11) or 11 percent; the net e¤ect of having Foreign Control in an autocracy
is (3+ 4+6 = 0:021) or around 2 percent. Finally, the net e¤ect of being an autocracy with
a Domestic Control regime is simply given by 4, i.e., -12 percent. The e¤ects for the other
political regimes are calculated in an analogolous manner. For a convenient overview, we list
all net e¤ects in Table 5.
Looking at the ndings shown in Table 5, we rst note that both Partnership and For-
eign Control have consistently positive income e¤ects and, with one exception, both control
regimes with foreign involvement lead to higher income than Domestic Control. Autocracies
and democracies present the clearest pictures: (substantial) foreign involvement of any kind
in the oil sector be it in a Partnership with domestic rms or under full Foreign Control 
has been related to higher income levels than full Domestic Control. Moreover, democratic
or autocratic countries that chose Partnership have on average achieved the best development
outcomes.
The exception is presented by the so-called anocracies, those countries that have either
weak democracies or weak autocracies (or no clear political regime at all). These are shown in
the last column of Table 5. Partnership is still linked to the highest income levels, but both
Domestic and Foreign Control have had positive impacts of similar magnitude on income levels.
For the sake of a clear ranking, we again perform alternative estimations, with Foreign Control
and political regime=0 as the base outcome (see Table 7 in the Appendix). These conrm that
Partnership has the highest positive impact (0.03) on income in the case of an anocracy, but
suggest that Domestic Control follows with a lower positive e¤ect (0.02), while Foreign Control
clearly leads to the relatively worst outcome (-0.03).
In summary, the ranking from Section 4.3 is mostly conrmed: Partnership has always
been associated with the highest income levels, regardless of the political regime of the oil-
producing country. Foreign Control follows with the second-highest positive income e¤ects,
albeit "only" in democracies and autocracies: in so-called anocracies, Domestic Control may
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have been the better control regime choice in terms of overall income. Otherwise, Domestic
Control is generally linked to the lowest income levels.
5 Conclusions
Our empirical analysis shows that a substantial degree of foreign involvement in a countrys oil
sector, be it in the form of a domestic-foreign partnership or full Foreign Control, has generally
led to higher income levels than going it aloneunder full Domestic Control. Moreover, the
ranking suggests that Partnership is associated with the highest income levels of all three oil
control regimes. The use of country xed e¤ects, as well as lagged explanatory variables, sug-
gests a causal relationship, though we acknowledge that the best way to demonstrate causality
would be through the use of instrumental variables. We have investigated another main po-
tential source of endogeneity in more detail, namely the issue of political contingency. We
found that Partnership still leads to the highest income regardless of the political regime of the
oil-producing country; however, Foreign Control may not be the best option in anocracies, i.e.,
countries where there is the greatest political uncertainty. Under this scenario, a large degree
of domestic involvement in oil production may be preferable in order to achieve high levels of
development.
If the goal is to attain high total domestic income, combining the expertise of foreign tech-
nology providers with partial domestic control seems the best option. This conclusion matches
anecdotal evidence from some oil producers that have chosen a Partnership exploitation strat-
egy (e.g., Norway) and may add an additional explanation for why some oil-producing countries
have managed to achieve positive development outcomes and escape the worst consequences of
a resource curse.
Looking at the theoretical literature, the existing models of incomplete contracts capture
some aspects but not the general mechanism underlying the relationships betweeen aggregate
domestic income and control regimes in primary sectors. Potential mechanisms include the
impact of asymmetric objectives between domestic governments and foreign rms as well as
aggregate resource-curse phenomena induced by ine¢ cient investments that result from the
structure of control rights within the primary sector. More generally, drawing explicit links
among the three key relationships i.e., the productivity-ownership nexus at the sectoral level,
the ownership-income relationship at the aggregate level, and the impact of political contin-
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gencies  in a formal model of resource-rich economy appears an important task for future
research.
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Table 2: Sensitivity tests with executive constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partnership 0.158*** 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.119***
(2.316) (1.836) (2.105) (2.252)
[3.502] [4.367] [4.497] [4.545]
Foreign 0.121** 0.0327 0.0365 0.0422
(1.669) (0.467) (0.517) (0.600)
[2.074] [0.747] [0.813] [1.019]
Labor productivity 0.0178*** 0.0202*** 0.0200*** 0.0176***
(7.640) (2.900) (2.933) (2.446)
[17.36] [7.425] [7.166] [5.269]
OPEC -0.000738 -0.0354 0.0342 0.0329
(-0.00457) (-0.271) (0.298) (0.286)
[-0.00812] [-0.529] [0.397] [0.374]
Oil o¤shore 0.0391* 0.0433** 0.0423* 0.0268
(0.564) (0.633) (0.608) (0.377)
[1.939] [2.290] [1.853] [1.047]
Executive constraints -0.0130** -0.00814 -0.00826 -0.00977*
(-1.485) (-0.973) (-0.755) (-0.896)
[-2.385] [-1.495] [-1.454] [-1.977]
Investment 0.00625*** 0.00740*** 0.00635***
(1.381) (1.496) (1.304)
[3.096] [3.180] [2.873]
Schooling -0.00280 0.00575
(-0.0586) (0.117)
[-0.0765] [0.146]
Openness 0.00253**
(1.993)
[2.051]
Constant 7.728*** 7.591*** 7.612*** 7.533***
(105.6) (83.97) (36.71) (32.62)
[198.3] [155.8] [52.05] [42.46]
Observations 444 414 390 390
Number of countries 57 56 50 50
Ave obs per country 7.800 7.400 7.800 7.800
R2 within 0.644 0.661 0.670 0.680
Notes : The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of ve-year period. Domestic Control is the
base outcome. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period. Estimations are xed e¤ects
(within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. Asterisks refer to Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Table 3: Oil control regimes by political regime
Domestic Foreign Partnership Total
Autocracy 119 73 96 288
Anocracy 52 108 49 209
Democracy 38 125 101 264
Total 209 306 246 761
Notes : The table shows the frequency of oil control regimes (in terms of ve-year periods) listed by political
regime.
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Table 4: Oil control regimes and political regimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partnership 0.107** 0.156*** 0.0409 0.178*** 0.179***
(1.687) (2.436) (0.582) (2.347) (2.754)
[2.348] [3.313] [0.782] [4.382] [3.532]
Foreign 0.122** 0.103** 0.000496 0.121** 0.150***
(1.702) (1.485) (0.00645) (1.487) (2.004)
[2.614] [2.052] [0.00855] [2.162] [2.879]
Polity 0.00336
(0.523)
[1.250]
Partnership*Polity -0.0118***
(-2.118)
[-4.581]
Foreign*Polity -0.0235***
(-3.639)
[-6.237]
Autocracy -0.0102 -0.116***
(-0.178) (-1.767)
[-0.583] [-6.269]
Democracy -0.0782** -0.00979
(-1.828) (-0.161)
[-2.587] [-0.181]
Anocracy 0.122***
(2.568)
[3.505]
Partnership*political regime 0.188*** -0.0950** -0.115**
(2.993) (-1.341) (-1.230)
[4.928] [-2.156] [-2.333]
Foreign*political regime 0.331*** -0.0853* -0.148*
(3.341) (-1.043) (-1.926)
[5.941] [-1.756] [-1.664]
Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 453 455 455 455 455
Number of countries 57 57 57 57 57
Ave obs per country 7.9 8 8 8 8
R2 within 0.659 0.644 0.654 0.645 0.646
Notes : The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of ve-year period. In column 1 control
regime dummies are interacted with Polity. In columns 3-5 oil control regime dummies are interacted with
political regime dummies (democracy, autocracy, anocracy). Domestic Control with political regime=0 is the
base outcome. Labor productivity and constant term are included in all estimations but not shown for space
reasons. All covariates are lagged by one period. Estimations are xed e¤ects (within) panel estimations. T-
statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
in square brackets. Asterisks refer to Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Table 5: Net e¤ects of oil control regimes
(1) (2) (3)
Democracy Autocracy Anocracy
with Domestic control -1.0 (-1.0) -12.0 (-9.5) 12.0 (12.7)
with Foreign control 2.0 (2.0) 2.1 (2.1) 12.0 (12.7)
with Partnership 7.0 (7.3) 11.0 (11.6) 18.0 (19.7)
Notes : The table gives the total (net) e¤ects in percent of oil control regimes on income according to the political
regime. The gures in parentheses give the precise e¤ects according to 100  [exp(^)  1]. Calculations are based
on the coe¢ cients from columns (3)-(5) in Table 4.
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A Appendix: data description and additional tables
Countries for which control rights regime data is available, with period included
(starting with beginning of rst ve-year period):
Albania (1930-2008), Algeria (1965-2008), Angola (1980-2008), Argentina (1910-2008), Aus-
tralia (1905-2008), Azerbaijan (1995-2008), Bahrain (1975-2008), Bolivia (1920-2008), Brazil
(1895-2008), Brunei (1985-2008), Cameroon (1965-2008), Canada (1870-2008), Chad (1965-
2008), Chile (1930-2008), China (1950-2008), Colombia (1915-2008), Congo Brazzaville (1965-
2008), Cuba (1955-2008), Denmark (1950-2008), East Timor (2005-2008), Ecuador (1910-
2008), Egypt (1955-2008), Equatorial Guinea (1980-2008), France (1925-2008), Gabon (1965-
2008), Germany (1990-2008), West Germany (1955-1989), Guatemala (1950-2008), India (1955-
2008), Indonesia (1960-2008), Iran (1905-2008), Iraq (1955-2008), Italy (1930-2008), Kaza-
khstan (1995-2008), Kuwait (1965-2008), Libya (1955-2008), Malaysia (1970-2008), Mexico
(1905-2008), Netherlands (1965-2008), Nigeria (1965-2008), Norway (1965-2008), Oman (1975-
2008), Pakistan (1950-2008), Papua New Guinea (1980-2008), Peru (1925-2008), Philippines
(1950-2008), Qatar (1975-2008), Romania (1895-2008), Imperial Russia (1875-1918), Russian
Federation (1995-2008), Saudi Arabia (1935-2008), Sudan (1975-2008), Syria (1955-2008), Thai-
land (1975-2008), Trinidad and Tobago (1965-2008), Tunisia (1960-2008), Turkey (1930-2008),
Turkmenistan (1995-2008), United Arab Emirates (1980-2008), Ukraine (2005-2008), United
Kingdom (1935-2008), United States (1900-2008), USSR (1920-2008), Uzbekistan (1995-2008),
Venezuela (1905-2008), Vietnam (1985-2008), Yemen (1990-2008), North Yemen (1975-1990),
South Yemen (1980-1990).
Technical notes: For the case of former colonies, the simple act of maintaining colonial-era
contracts upon independence until their expiry does not constitute a national law in the sense of
it being passed deliberately by a sovereign government. The year of inclusion of a country in our
dataset does therefore not necessarily coincide with its year of gaining independence. We are
aware that there is often a time lag between the introduction of a new piece of legislation and
its full implementation throughout the petroleum industry. E.g., the decision to switch from a
domestic control structure to partnership may involve delineating the geographical sectors to
be o¤ered for tender to foreign companies, organizing the bidding rounds, and drawing up the
nal contracts, a process which can take several months or even years. However, a legislative
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change in control rights structures is usually transformed into a real change, which is why
we concentrate on the date of the passing of the legislation rather than on the less precisely
denable date of its full implementation. A borderline case is presented by Argentina between
1910-1963. The original executive decree of December 1907 excluded private concessions for the
newly-discovered petroleum reserves, and therefore set up a majority domestic control structure.
However, after Law 7059 of 1910, the deposits were little by little opened to exploitation by
private (mostly foreign) investors, with the new national oil company being limited to the
deposits on the shrinking Public Lands. We thus classify the control regime as mixed domestic-
foreign from 1910-1963, even though several decrees passed between 1910-1955 tried to limit the
activities of (foreign) private oil companies, with very little e¤ect on the ourishing industry.
There was therefore a certain discrepancy between formal regulation and practice on the ground,
which persisted for several decades. It wasnt until nationalization in 1963 that all private oil
companiescontracts were truly and nally declared null and void a situation which however
lasted only until 1966, when mixed domestic-foreign control was fully mandated by law (Solberg,
1979).
Data and sources
income per capita: natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1990 international Geary-Khamis
(PPP-adjusted) dollars. Source: Maddison (2006).
oil control rights regime: oil sector control rights variable categorized into majority domestic,
majority foreign, or majority mixed domestic-foreign (i.e., partnership) control. Source:
own coding.
polity: revised Combined Polity Score. This variable modies the combined annual POLITY
score by applying a simple treatment, or x, to convert instances of standardized
authority scores (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores, i.e., within the
range -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy). Source: Polity IV database
(Marshall et al., 2010).
executive constraints: measure of the decision rules that dene the extent of institutionalized
constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or col-
lectivities. The measure ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or
subordination). Periods of political upheavals such as transitions or occupations (scores
36
of -88, -77, -66) are dropped from the sample. Source: Polity IV database (Marshall et
al., 2010).
democracy, autocracy, anocracy: dummy variables based on the original, non-revised polity
variable. As suggested by Marshall and Cole (2011), democracy has value one if the
polity score is 6 and higher; autocracy has value one if the polity score is -6 or lower; and
anocracy has value one if the polity score lies between -5 and 5, as well as when there are
various forms of interrupted government (polity scores of -88, -77 or -88). Source: own
coding according to Polity IV database (Marshall et al., 2010).
OPEC: dummy variable with value one in a period when a country is a member of the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Source: own coding based on OPEC
information on http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/.
oil o¤shore: dummy variable with value one in a period when a country discovers o¤shore oil.
Source: own coding based on Lujala et al. (2007).
labor productivity: labor productivity per person employed in thousands of 1990 US$ (con-
verted at Geary Khamis PPPs), average over ve-year period. Available from 1950 on-
wards. Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (2011).
investment: Average investment Share of PPP converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant
prices [rgdpl] over ve-year period. Available from 1950 onwards. Source: Penn World
Tables 7.1 (Heston et al. 2012). For China, o¢ cial data (version 1) were taken.
openness: Average openness at 2005 constant prices (%) [(exports+imports)/rgdpl] over ve-
year period. Available from 1950 onwards. Source: Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston et al.
2012). For China, o¢ cial data (version 1) were taken.
years of schooling: Average years of total schooling of population over ve-year period. Avail-
able from 1950 onwards. Source: Barro Lee education dataset v. 2.0, 07/10 (Barro and
Lee, 2010).
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Table 7: Oil control regimes and political regimes with Foreign Control as omitted category
(1) (2) (3)
Partnership 0.0431 0.0644 0.0293
(0.645) (0.839) (0.546)
[1.146] [1.485] [0.769]
Domestic 0.00742 -0.113** -0.148***
(0.0968) (-1.402) (-1.979)
[0.132] [-2.098] [-2.851]
Autocracy 0.218***
(2.149)
[3.887]
Democracy -0.0893*
(-1.256)
[-1.788]
Anocracy -0.0294
(-0.482)
[-0.463]
Partnership*political regime -0.146*** -0.0140 0.0366
(-1.768) (-0.168) (0.369)
[-2.861] [-0.246] [0.695]
Domestic*political regime -0.337*** 0.0802 0.157*
(-3.393) (0.978) (2.051)
[-6.231] [1.645] [1.793]
Labor productivity 0.0168*** 0.0173*** 0.0172***
(5.935) (7.213) (7.185)
[19.24] [16.79] [16.80]
Constant 7.759*** 7.814*** 7.799***
(105.2) (103.2) (124.2)
[278.3] [234.4] [363.4]
Period dummies yes yes yes
Observations 455 455 455
Number of countries 57 57 57
Ave obs per country 8 8 8
R2 within 0.654 0.645 0.646
Notes : The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of ve-year period. Oil control regime dummies
are interacted with political regime dummies (democracy, autocracy, anocracy). Foreign Control with political
regime=0 is the base outcome. All covariates are lagged by one period. Estimations are xed e¤ects (within)
panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors in square brackets. Asterisks refer to Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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